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A/H1N1 flu pANdemic
neuraminidase inhibitors in 
pandemic a/H1n1 flu
Jefferson and colleagues describe the 
effectiveness of neuraminidase inhibitors in 
otherwise healthy adults infected with seasonal 
flu virus,1 but it is mainly the A/H1N1 flu virus that 
is currently in circulation.
Given the limited availability of vaccine against 
2009 pandemic A/H1N1 flu, antiviral drugs have 
assumed a prominent role in reducing severe 
flu related morbidity and mortality during the 
pandemic. Summarised data show benefit from 
neuraminidase inhibitor treatment in reducing 
complications, including admission to intensive 
care and death, among hospitalised patients with 
A/H1N1 infection.2 These data were collected 
during the current pandemic in the United States 
and Mexico without industry funding.3 4 Data from 
seasonal flu investigations such as that by Lee 
et al also show a reduced risk of death among 
hospitalised patients with laboratory confirmed 
flu who received a neuraminidase inhibitor, even 
more than 48 hours after the onset of symptoms.5
The risks associated with the use of 
neuraminidase inhibitors during the pandemic 
are being monitored. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, information has been collected on 
around a million treatment courses. Adverse 
effects have not changed, and no new safety 
concerns have been identified. No evidence 
has been found of oseltamivir being directly 
responsible for any death.6
In the context of 2009 pandemic 
 A/ H1N1 flu, the benefits of 
treatment with neuraminidase 
inhibitors outweigh the risk of 
adverse events among people who 
present with severe disease or who 
have risk factors for developing 
severe disease. With vaccination, 
antiviral treatment remains 
effective and essential in reducing 
severe illness and death among 
patients with 2009 pandemic  
A/H1N1 flu.
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Data access is matter of trust
The UK Faculty of Public Health strongly supports 
the BMJ’s call for mandatory disclosure of 
raw data of all trials cited in drug licensing 
applications and marketing claims.1
We see this as a first step towards a position in 
which only external independent trials published 
in peer reviewed journals, with full access to raw 
data, should be allowable when seeking a licence 
or marketing a product. This would 
require international agreement by 
health technology regulators.
Interpreting the evidence base 
for healthcare planning and 
commissioning is a key public 
health function. Full disclosure 
and openness to scrutiny of 
evidence on efficacy and safety 
are crucial if the pharmaceutical 
industry is to maintain the full 
trust and confidence of patients, 
practitioners, policy makers, and 
the wider public.
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Zanamivir should be inhaled, 
not nebulised
Jefferson and colleagues say that nebulisation 
is the route of administration for zanamivir.1 
However, prescribers should be aware that 
the approved use of zanamivir in the United 
States and European Union is by inhalation, not 
nebulisation.2 3
The Food and Drug Administration recently 
issued a warning against using the inhalation 
formulation in a solubilised form for nebulised 
delivery,4 and letters have been sent to 
prescribers in the US proscribing the use of 
zanamivir by the nebulised route because of a 
reported death after administration this way.5
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life threatening infections 
labelled swine flu
Algorithms for remote diagnosis and issue 
of antiviral drugs are indispensable during 
a pandemic.1 Their application through 
the National Pandemic Flu Service to both 
high and low prevalence areas is, however, 
controversial, and the lack of specificity in 
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the use of the algorithm has been highlighted 
by Payne et al and at November’s meeting 
of the Federation of Infection Societies in 
Birmingham.2
Over six weeks (1 July 2009 to 15 August 
2009) we reviewed cases of potentially 
life threatening conditions admitted to the 
Newcastle infection services in which diagnosis 
and management were delayed because of an 
initial, incorrect diagnosis of swine flu. During 
this time, rates of novel H1N1 swab positivity 
(22/336) suggested a local prevalence of 6.5% 
of patients presenting to hospital with a flu-
like illness compared with 11.8% throughout 
England.3
A label of swine flu resulted in an average 
diagnostic delay of three days in six adults 
and two children who were admitted with 
potentially life threatening infection requiring 
timely antimicrobials. They had instead 
meningococcal meningitis; severe (11% 
parasitaemia) and mild (0.2%) Plasmodium 
falciparum malaria complicated by renal failure; 
acute myeloblastic leukaemia presenting 
with febrile pancytopenia; Campylobacter 
gastroenteritis with renal failure; Haemophilus 
influenzae respiratory tract infection (bone 
marrow transplant recipient); complicated soft 
tissue infection; and a fatal Staphylococcus 
aureus bacteraemia with multiorgan failure.
Our results show that a concise history 
must cover travel, immunosuppression, and 
drug exposure comprehensively and that 
current local epidemiological data should 
influence the interpretation and application 
of algorithms. Algorithms do not replace 
comprehensive history taking, clinical acumen, 
laboratory support, and, above all, common 
sense.
Catherine F Houlihan specialty trainee in infectious 
diseases, Department of Infectious Diseases and Tropical 
Diseases, Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Trust, 
Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 4LP catherine.houlihan@
doctors.org.uk 
Sanjay Patel registrar, Department of Paediatric Infectious 
Diseases/Immunology, Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS 
Trust, Newcastle upon Tyne NE4 6BE 
David a Price consultant in infectious diseases, Department 
of Infectious Diseases and Tropical Diseases, Newcastle upon 
Tyne Hospitals NHS Trust, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 4LP 
Manoj Valappil consultant virologist, North East England 
Regional Laboratory, Health Protection Agency, Newcastle 
upon Tyne NE4 6BE 
uli Schwab consultant in infectious diseases, Department of 
Infectious Diseases and Tropical Diseases, Newcastle upon 
Tyne Hospitals NHS Trust, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 4LP
Competing interests: None declared.
Maynard A, Bloor K. The economic impact of pandemic 1 
influenza. BMJ 2009;339:b4888. (19 November.)
Payne R, Darton TC, Greig JM. Systematic telephone 2 
triage of possible “swine” influenza leads to potentially 
serious misdiagnosis of infectious diseases. J Infect 
2009;59:371-2.
Health Protection Agency. Weekly national influenza report 3 
20. August 2009 (week 34).
Cite this as: BMJ 2010;340:c137
drug firm coNflictiNg iNterests
radical change, not tweaking,  
is needed
Lawton makes the case against major reform 
of the way the pharmaceutical and medical 
device industry currently does business against 
Goldacre’s call for the conduct of clinical trials 
by disinterested third parties to offset the 
inherent biases of industry sponsored clinical 
trials.1 2 He dismisses Goldacre’s argument 
that the commercial interests of the industry 
produce biased evidence that misleads doctors 
and thereby increases patient morbidity and 
mortality. Instead, Lawton urges tweaking of the 
current system to improve its functioning, putting 
forth several threadbare arguments about the 
productivity of industry research and efficacy 
of government regulation and quality control 
oversight.
Fisher provides a revealing view of what goes 
on in the offices of doctors who receive funding 
from industry to conduct research on their 
patients and its biasing effects.3
The political momentum in the United States 
seems to be building for broader reforms in view 
of the extent of conflicts of interest reported 
by the US Health and Human Services Office of 
the Attorney General among grant recipients of 
the National Institutes of Health and the staff 
themselves.4 5
If society is really serious about 
improving the public health through 
the production of valid and reliable 
science for use by doctors on 
behalf of their patients, Lawton’s 
recommendation for tweaking the 
current system to achieve marginal 
improvements should be rejected. 
The weight of evidence points to 
the need for radical change, not 
tweaking.
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The limits of impartiality
I cannot imagine why anyone would think that 
a system of self assessment by vendors could 
work.1 Human beings simply are not equipped 
to undertake impartial assessments of their own 
income earning products. They never have been, 
and they are becoming less able to do so as 
moral standards slip.
Wake up and look around you. We simply 
cannot be trusted to run a system impartially 
or even fairly any more. My local NHS trust has 
been found guilty of falsifying statistics. So 
has my local MP. And my bank. And my local 
climatologist. And so on.
Jerry r Whitmarsh non-medical consultant, Maidstone, Kent 
ME17 buyloads@gmail.com
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If only industry funded trials 
were as well done as the WHI
Lawton shoots himself in the foot when he uses 
the women’s health initiative study as an example 
of a non-industry funded study that deviates 
from good standards.1 Unlike many industry 
funded studies this enormous and extremely 
complex trial had impeccable standards. The 
protocol was published in great detail, 
including details of the data safety 
monitoring procedures, and the trial 
was stopped because the design-
specified weighted log rank test 
statistic for breast cancer (z=−3.19) 
crossed the designated boundary 
(z=−2.32). There was no post hoc 
change in the significance level as 
claimed, and breast cancer was one 
of the end points of the study from the 
start, as can be seen in the protocol published 
in 1998, the trial being stopped in 2002. Such 
transparency in study design is unfortunately rare 
for industry funded studies, in which changes in 
outcomes or analyses or simply a decision not to 
publish are not rare.
Obviously not all non-industry funded trials 
are so well designed and performed, but the 
empirical evidence shows that the biases 
introduced into the literature by industry funded 
trials are substantial, biases which can adversely 
affect our health.
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Hospital, Montreal, QC, Canada H3T 1C5  
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tHe price of sileNce
liverpool chairman  
responds
I am concerned about the way in which the 
article by Gornall, originally researched in July 
2009, was eventually published in October, 
and also the disgraceful editorial comment that 
accompanied it.1 2
Despite earlier contact during July, the trust 
was not afforded the courtesy of being informed 
that you intended to publish after a lapse of some 
three months. Had you chosen to inform us that 
you were going to print we could have perhaps 
corrected some of the factual inaccuracies in 
the piece. An example of this is the assertion 
that all of the compromise agreements entered 
into by the trust were with doctors in order to 
“gag” them. Accurately reported, the article 
could have referred to the fact that agreements 
were with a range of staff who left the trust for 
various reasons, only two of whom were doctors. 
It would also have been accurate and balanced 
to have reported that there is a specific clause in 
such agreements which states that “nothing  . . . 
prevents the employee making disclosures to 
the National Patient Safety Agency or any NHS 
regulatory body.”
Apart from being guilty of taking the same 
biased approach as the main article, the 
editorial is also written in the most insulting, 
inflammatory, and unprofessional terms about 
an organisation that has a long track record of 
success and an excellent reputation locally, 
nationally, and internationally.
The slapdash and biased treatment of what is 
undoubtedly a serious issue does little to further 
a mature debate and in the process brings the 
standing of the BMJ into disrepute. Fortunately 
your discerning readers will recognise that 
this was an error of judgment on the editorial 
department’s part.
Ken Morris chairman, Liverpool Women’s NHS Foundation 
Trust, Liverpool L8 7SS helen.gavin@lwh.nhs.uk
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Two doctors?
The management of Liverpool Women’s NHS 
Foundation Trust now make the claim that they 
have gagged only two doctors.1 I am shocked 
and surprised by this new claim. Two years ago I 
made a freedom of information request for all the 
compromise agreements containing gag clauses 
which “the trust had entered into with doctors.” 
At the Information Commissioner’s instigation 
the trust provided the agreements, with names 
and dates black pencilled. There were 12. The 
decision notice issued by the commissioner 
in November 2009 confirmed that my request 
related solely to agreements with doctors.2 If 
management wish to persist in this new claim, 
perhaps it would be wise for them to provide all 
12 agreements, with job titles, for independent 
inspection by the Department of Health or an 
appropriate member of parliament.
I also note that management are attempting 
to fire off a few angry flares at the BMJ rather 
than deal with the serious issues arising 
from Gornall’s piece.3 The 
trust used a local law firm, 
Mace and Jones, where 
one of the trust’s non-
executive directors sits as 
chairman, to draft at least 
some of these compromise 
agreements—certain of which 
included “super gag clauses” 
preventing doctors from 
making any communication 
about any NHS matter with 
any member of the media. 
That law firm is now under 
investigation by the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority for a 
possible conflict of interest. 
The same law firm threatened my father with 
an injunction if he spoke about his concerns 
to local members of parliament. Questions 
surrounding the trust’s behaviour need answers, 
since management are behaving like Roman 
centurions, with the aid of lawyers, in the rabid 
persecution of any critical comment.
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Gagging and duties 
Jane Cassidy’s article raises several pressing 
questions.1 The examples given are shocking, 
but many of us will be aware of others. There 
seems to be a trend for NHS trust administrations 
to abuse power—with law, regulations, 
guidelines, agreements reached, and promises 
made ignored or bypassed as convenient.
Why? Firstly, because this is a way for 
administrators to assert their power and 
impose decisions. Administrators also have an 
impossible task—they are expected to extract 
more from less, with guidelines and objectives 
altered unpredictably. Secondly, because there 
is no immediate counter to this abuse. NHS 
reforms brought in a sea change in philosophy, a 
revolution in the way things are done, a plethora 
of regulation, and inadequate or absent checks 
and balances. Any political mechanism lacking 
the latter (also transparency and accountability) 
inevitably evolves towards dictatorial abuse. 
Abuse can be countered in three ways. Firstly, 
a united approach by doctors in a trust. Doctors, 
however, are notoriously difficult to persuade to 
act in this manner. Secondly, 
legal action. But public 
disclosure of incompetence 
and dishonesty would be 
damaging to organisations 
and individuals. Thirdly, a 
framework within the NHS 
to examine and adjudicate 
in matters of administrative 
abuse would help defuse 
the situation. Many NHS 
employees, not just doctors, 
are demoralised and fearful 
of vindictive and abusive 
actions. Patients have an 
ombudsman; employees 
need the same. This request 
needs to be stated forcefully, loudly, and 
persistently to have a chance of succeeding.
For this we need the leadership and initiative 
of the BMA, which could also help assert the 
overarching obligations of doctors. All practising 
doctors are primarily regulated by the ethics 
of the profession, even if this contradicts 
local regulations, contracts, or administration 
decisions.
Paul J Galea consultant anaesthetist, Wigan Infirmary  
WN1 2NN pjgchalfont@ntlworld.com
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VAreNicliNe ANd suicide
Safety data from new Zealand
The recent letters on varenicline and suicide 
raise interesting issues about different 
approaches to identify and quantify risk in 
pharmacovigilance.1 2 In New Zealand the 
Intensive Medicines Monitoring Programme 
(IMMP)3 is currently performing an observational 
cohort study of varenicline. Our cohort is 
established directly from pharmacy dispensing 
data, which more accurately estimates 
varenicline exposure than prescription records 
used in database studies.4 The IMMP identifies 
adverse events from follow-up questionnaires 
sent to patients’ doctors, spontaneous reports 
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Causes of death in IMMP first year cohort* 
Case Age
Treatment duration 
(days)
On medicine at time 
of death?
Time to death after 
last dose (days)† Cause of death
1 24 Not known Yes Not known Suicide
2 65 78 No 7 Subarachnoid haemorrhage; 
cerebrovascular accident
3 61 55 No 25 Femoral thrombosis; 
respiratory failure; lung 
carcinoma
4 61 47 No 42 Carcinoma disseminated
5 64 127 No 53 Metastatic carcinoma 
bronchus
6 49 46 No 56 Respiratory failure
7 80 14 No 58 Myocardial infarction
8 44 14 No 66 Respiratory failure
9 67 43 No 68 Respiratory failure
10 67 43 No 90 Ovarian cancer; 
cerebrovascular accident; 
myocardial infarction
*First year IMMP cohort included all New Zealand patients dispensed a varenicline prescription from 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008.
†Deaths occurring more than 100 days after stopping varenicline were excluded from this analysis.
to the NZ Pharmacovigilance Centre, and record 
linkage to national mortality datasets to identify 
patients who have died.3
Early results from the IMMP study may help 
quantify the risks of varenicline in postmarketing 
use. Of 3415 patients dispensed varenicline 
during the first year of monitoring, 10 died, 
including one from suicide (table). Deaths were 
equally distributed between men and women. 
Using intensive follow-up methods we believe 
we are unlikely to have missed other deaths and 
thus estimate the risk of completed suicide is 1 
in 3415 patients or 3/10 000 (95% confidence 
interval 0.07 to 16/10 000). This estimate may 
change as the IMMP study continues and the 
cohort increases in size.
Identifying and quantifying risk is important 
for doctors prescribing medicines and patients 
taking them. It is unlikely that one study or 
methodological approach will provide all the 
answers we need. In monitoring the post-
marketing safety of medicines, we sometimes 
refer to the “pharmacovigilance tool box” and 
recognise that different tools are suitable for 
different purposes. We must work collaboratively 
and share our data whenever possible in the 
interests of public health.
Mira Harrison-Woolrych director, Intensive Medicines 
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an under-recognised risk 
Osteoporosis is another important but under-
recognised risk of androgen deprivation therapy.1 
Few guidelines exist to help detect and manage 
bone loss in these men.
As survival from prostate cancer increases, 
osteoporosis and its complications will probably 
become more common. A retrospective study of 
over 50 000 men with prostate cancer found a 
significant association between number of doses 
of gonadotrophin releasing hormone agonist 
and fracture risk.2 Importantly, fractures in these 
patients are an independent adverse predictor of 
survival.3
Patients and general practitioners should be 
given clear information and lifestyle advice to 
reduce the risk of osteoporosis, emphasising 
the need for exercise, reducing smoking, limiting 
alcohol consumption, and a diet that includes 
calcium and vitamin D. Exercise and diet are 
particularly important because the effects of 
androgen deprivation include muscle loss and 
increased body fat.
In the absence of guidelines, teams managing 
prostate cancer need to formulate and implement 
coherent strategies to minimise morbidity from this 
treatment. Dual energy x ray absorptiometry (DXA) 
scans are cheap, easy to perform, and underused 
in these patients in the UK. We recommend that a 
DXA scan be considered for all men starting long 
term androgen deprivation therapy.
Jennifer M Sherriff specialist registrar clinical oncology, 
University Hospital Birmingham NHS Trust,  
Birmingham B15 2TH  jennifer.sherriff@nhs.net 
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tHe mysterious dr foster
Coders need guidance 
Nigel Hawkes shows how Dr Foster’s hospital 
standardised mortality rate can be influenced 
by the presence of comorbidities.1 It is hard 
to believe that hospital mortality figures now 
depend more on how the hospital’s coders 
perform than on the skills of its doctors and 
nurses. Some coders believe that they can 
use information on comorbidities only from 
the current episode for coding purposes 
whereas others use information from previous 
episodes. Such variations are widespread, 
and the responsible bodies such as NHS 
classifications service need to produce clear 
guidelines to standardise coding across the 
country and make Dr Foster’s analysis more 
equitable.
Sunku H Guptha consultant physician, Peterborough and 
Stamford NHS Trust, Peterborough PE3 6DA  
sunku123@btinternet.com
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BABy p HospitAl
Putting the matter straight
We’ve said that we wish to resolve issues 
with Dr Holt swiftly and amicably, and this is 
best done through dialogue. However, your 
news report by Clare Dyer is inaccurate.1 Great 
Ormond Street Hospital did employ the doctors 
in the Haringey community service, but we did 
not run the service or set funding levels. Great 
Ormond Street ran the service only from April 
2008.
Jane Collins chief executive, Great Ormond Street Hospital 
for Children NHS Trust WC1N 3BH  coxs@gosh.nhs.uk
Competing interests: None declared.
Dyer C. Doctors had warned of understaffing at Baby 1 
P hospital, inquiry finds. BMJ  2009;339:b5404. (9 
December.)
Cite this as: BMJ 2010;340:c146
